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Orphan versus non-orphan IPOs: The difference analyst coverage makes 
Romain Boissin 
 
Numerous articles in academic journals or in the press have highlighted the 
importance of financial analysts’ coverage of firms that are going public. Newly public 
firms rely on their underwriters throughout the IPO process, especially during the 
marketing phase. The underwriters’ services include determining the offering price and 
the distribution of shares, but what is of particular importance for the issuer is receiving 
coverage through their financial analysts. During the IPO, investors are limited to 
information contained in the prospectus. As a result, the flow of information is restricted 
and sparse. Financial analysts can reduce these asymmetries. Indeed, coverage can 
transcend borders and financial markets and put the firm in the spotlight. Coverage is 
seen to add value by the firm because it can generate publicity, attract new consumers 
(Cliff and Denis, 2004), boost the share price (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Aggarwal et al., 
2002), attract new investors, and reduce the cost of capital. However, coverage is not 
uniformly distributed and is mainly concentrated on large firms (as measured by their 
market capitalization). In the mid-2000s, 50 per cent of IPO firms were covered by a 
financial analyst and 35 per cent had no coverage1. Newly public firms often suffer 
from lack of analyst coverage even though it is widely accepted that, because coverage 
adds value, the allocation of resources to attract such coverage is a worthy investment. 
This paper addresses the resources at the disposal of IPO firms to attract 
financial analysts. We examine the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan 
IPOs to explain what value has to be attributed to analyst coverage. We are interested in 
the added value of analyst coverage, making relevant distinctions between orphan IPO 
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firms (those without analyst coverage within 5 years of their issuance) and non-orphan 
IPO firms (those with analyst coverage within 5 years of their issuance). This paper 
addresses the question of the importance of analyst coverage for the long-run returns of 
IPO firms over the period from 1991 to 2010. 
Over the years, academic research has noted the importance of analyst coverage. 
Krigman et al. (2001) suggested that the most important motivation for firms to switch 
underwriters between their IPO and a Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) is to obtain 
additional and influential analyst coverage. Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and 
Denis (2004) argued that the underpricing of newly public firms is positively related to 
analyst coverage. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004), the average underpricing of 
IPOs was 7 per cent in the 1980s, which doubled to 15 per cent from 1990 to 1998, 
before jumping to 65 per cent during the internet bubble. Part of this increase can be 
attributed to analyst coverage, which has grown more important over the years. Bradley 
et al. (2003) showed that the number of managing underwriters in a syndicate is a good 
indicator of the coverage enjoyed by newly listed firms at the time of their IPOs. 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) examined the syndicates of 1638 IPOs and found evidence 
that each additional co-manager results in 0.8 additional analyst recommendations 
within 3 months of the IPO. Bradley et al. (2008b), however, did not find incremental 
coverage to be related to improved long-run performance. Bradley et al. (2004) focused 
on the 2-year post-issue performance (at the end of the IPO’s quiet period) of IPOs that 
receive analyst coverage compared to those that do not. The authors found that orphans 
significantly underperformed compared to non-orphans during the period from 1996 to 
1998. 
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Unlike Bradley et al. (2004), we analyse long-run performance from one to five 
years after the IPO. We measure the influence of analyst coverage on the long-run 
performance of IPO firms over a five-year horizon. We are then able to observe how 
long-run performance adjusts to analyst coverage. Our observation period is large and 
encompasses the period from 1991 to 2010. Our definition of an orphan IPO firm differs 
from that of Bradley et al. (2004) because the authors consider an IPO firm to be an 
orphan if “there is an absence of a research report/analyst recommendation at the end of 
the quiet period by at least one underwriter in the managing syndicate”. 
In US IPOs, during the one- to five-year horizon, we find a significant long-run 
abnormal performance by orphans (IPOs without analyst coverage) compared to non-
orphans (IPOs with analyst coverage). For instance, by the fifth year after the IPO, buy-
and-hold abnormal returns for orphans were a significant -52.95 per cent compared to -
8.07 per cent for non-orphans, a difference that is statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level. Further analysis reveals that this outperformance by non-orphans stems from 
high analyst coverage. Our results are robust after accounting for venture capital 
backing, underwriting syndicates, underpricing, institutional investor ownership, or 
operating performance variables. 
The paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the existing literature. In the 
second section, we describe the methodology, data and sample statistics. The third 
section presents the findings, and the last section concludes the paper. 
 
1. Literature review 
Khorana et al. (2009) examine the consequences of the loss of coverage for a 
firm over the period from 1983 to 2004. They find that firms that lose all analyst 
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coverage are significantly more likely to get delisted. This study sheds light on the 
importance of analyst coverage for firms. To avoid such a situation, the firm may 
acquire the means to attract financial analysts during its IPO process. Previous studies 
have found that the underwriting syndicate and the presence of venture capitalists or 
institutional investors in the IPO, as well as underpricing, allow the firm to increase its 
probability of analyst coverage. 
Krigman et al. (2001) reveal that changes in underwriters (between an IPO and 
an SEO) are made because the firm wants more reputable underwriters that will provide 
more coverage. The authors find that firms are more likely to make changes when 
analyst coverage is not to their liking. In addition, firms do not hesitate to allocate 
resources to improving their coverage. According to Ellis et al. (2005), almost 50 per 
cent of firms making an SEO change their lead underwriters. This change takes place 
not because of the reputation of the underwriter but for the coverage of analysts whose 
buy recommendation are often more favourable than those of their predecessors. Corwin 
and Schultz (2005) examine the underwriting syndicates of 1638 IPOs between 1997 
and 2002 in the United States. They emphasise the importance of co-managers, stating 
that the addition of a co-manager to the syndicate increases analyst coverage within the 
3 months after the IPO. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that co-managers are included 
in syndicates exclusively to provide additional coverage. 
The presence of venture capitalists in the IPO may encourage analysts to follow 
the firm. Several studies note a positive relationship between the presence of venture 
capitalists in the IPO and analyst coverage. Jain and Kini (2000) find that venture 
capitalists influence institutional investors, investment bankers and their analysts to 
ensure the success of the IPO process. This influence is the result of many interactions, 
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especially with underwriters. Gompers and Lerner (1997) estimate that approximately 
25 per cent of venture capitalists have an affiliation with underwriters. A venture 
capitalist involved in an IPO can advise its underwriter and vice versa1. These types of 
interactions also arise between venture capitalists and financial analysts. Therefore, 
venture capitalists can attract underwriters and thus facilitate analyst coverage. 
According to Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006), the presence of venture capitalists in 
an IPO leads 0.22 more analysts to follow the firm. 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) and Aggarwal et al. (2002) argue that underpricing 
attracts an analyst following. Cliff and Denis (2004) find that underpricing is positively 
related to analyst coverage. The authors empirically examine the assumption that firms 
attract analyst coverage through underpricing. They study 1050 firms conducting an 
IPO and an SEO between 1993 and 2000 and find a strong correlation between 
underpricing and the frequency and quality of post-IPO analyst coverage. A total of 94 
per cent of highly underpriced firms receive initial analyst coverage compared to 84 per 
cent of minimally underpriced firms. The authors conclude that underpricing 
compensates, in part, for expected analyst coverage. James and Karceski (2006) note 
that IPO firms that have not benefited from analyst coverage are significantly less 
underpriced (average of 27 per cent) compared with those covered by financial analysts 
(average of 72 per cent) over the period from 1999-2000. Das et al. (2006) show that 
IPOs with low (high) analyst coverage exhibit underpricing close to 13 per cent (47 per 
cent) over the period from 1986 to 2000. In contrast, Bradley et al (2008a) do not 
establish any link between underpricing and analyst coverage following 683 IPOs from 
1999 to 2000. 
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Ownership structure also affects analyst coverage. Bhushan (1989) and O'Brien 
and Bhushan (1990) find that the likelihood of analyst coverage is associated with the 
interests of institutional investors in the firm. The authors conclude that there is a 
positive relationship between institutional investor ownership and analyst coverage. 
Lang et al. (2004) and Boubaker and Labegorre (2008) indicate that analysts are 
reluctant to cover a firm managed by controlling family members. This is explained, in 
part, by the reliance of these firms on private communication channels rather than 
public disclosure, producing a poor informational environment. 
 
2. Methodology, data and sample statistics 
2.1 - Methodology: 
The results of long-run performance studies are sensitive to methodological 
choices. We therefore present our results using two frequently used and recommended 
methodologies (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
First, we use the calendar-time approach of Fama and French (1996). Their 
three-factor model assumes that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-
free rate [(ERi) – Rf ] is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the 
excess return on a broad market portfolio (RM – Rf); (ii) the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, 
small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-
to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high 
minus low). Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio i is, 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ െ ௙ܴ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሾEሺR୑ሻ െ R୤ሿ ൅ ݏ௜EሺSMBሻ ൅ ݄௜EሺHMLሻ ൅ ߝ௜, 
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where E(Ri) is the monthly return on the IPO portfolio, Rf is the one-month Treasury bill 
rate, E (RM) is the monthly return on an equally weighted market portfolio of NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks, E(SMB) is the difference between the returns on 
portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the median), and E(HML) is the 
difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks 
(above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles of book-to-market ratios). 
Second, we use an event-time approach, as in the study of Brav and Gompers 
(1997). Fama and French (1992, 1993) have shown that the size and book-to-market 
portfolios are important determinants of the cross section of stock returns. We compare 
the performance of IPOs with that of size and book-to-market portfolios. Starting in 
January 1991, we use all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks to create size quartile 
breakpoints with an equal number of firms in each size quartile. Size is measured by the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end of the preceding 
month. The monthly book-to-market data for each firm are extracted from the 
Datastream database. Within each size quartile, we create four book-to-market 
portfolios with an equal number of firms in each book-to-market quartile, resulting in 
16 size and book-to-market portfolios. Equally weighted returns are calculated for each 
portfolio. To avoid comparing IPO firms with themselves, we eliminate IPO firms from 
the various portfolios for five years after their equity issues. Each issue is matched with 
its corresponding benchmark portfolio. 
The Long-run performance is calculated using the BHAR methodology. The 
difference between a return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm and the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate expected return 
(BHAR) is 
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where Rit is defined as the month t simple return of a sample firm and E(Rit) is the 
month t expected return of the sample firm (that is, the return of firm i’s benchmark 
over the same period). 
Long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positively skewed and this positive 
skewness leads to negatively biased t-statistics. Lyon et al. (1999) recommend the use 
of a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic to eliminate this skewness bias. 
2.2 Data and sample statistics 
The data come from different sources. We first identify firms that went public 
from 1991 to 2010 in the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) Common 
Stock Initial Public Offerings database. Consistent with prior studies, we eliminate IPOs 
that are classified as ADRs, REITs, and closed-end funds, along with offerings that 
have a file range midpoint of less than €8 and financial services IPO firms (SIC code 
6000-6999). Our sample contains 1265 IPOs. Analyst data are collected from the First 
Call database. 
Long-run performance is calculated using the Datastream monthly stock price database. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A shows the 
distribution of the IPO sample over the three sub-periods. Panel B provides the market 
capitalization of the IPOs in our sample at the end of the first month following the 
offering. Our sample offerings are substantially large in terms of market capitalization. 
We find that 63 per cent of our sample’s IPOs raise $200 million or more and 25 per 
cent of the offerings have a capitalization ranging from $50 million to $200 million. 
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Panel C documents that the industry composition of our sample is well-distributed, with 
the greatest concentration, 17 per cent, being in the business services industry. 
Insert Table 1 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for orphan and non-orphan IPOs. There are 
253 IPOs classified as orphans and 1012 classified as non-orphans. The long-term debt 
of non-orphans is higher than that of orphan IPOs (significant at the 1 per cent level 
using w and t tests). The average orphan raises $309.61 million in its IPO, compared to 
$1067.46 million for the average non-orphan. This difference is statistically significant 
at the 1 per cent level. Like prior research, analyst coverage increases according to firm 
size. We find no significant differences in venture capital backing between orphan and 
non-orphan IPOs over the entire period. Orphans are associated with more underwriting 
syndicates, with a mean of 6.86 managing underwriters, compared to 6.48 for non-
orphans (the difference is statistically significant using a w test). There is a weak 
relationship between analyst coverage and underpricing. For instance, orphans have 
initial returns of 13.85 per cent compared to 15.53 per cent for non-orphans. Non-
orphans are more underpriced than orphans and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 10% level using a w test. Non-orphans are associated with more institutional 
investor ownership than orphans. For instance, a mean of 73.89 per cent of the shares of 
IPOs with analyst coverage are held by institutional investors, compared to 31.74 per 
cent for orphan IPO firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level and is confirmed by both t and w tests. 
Insert Table 2 
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3. Results 
Table 3 shows that IPO firms in the US have statistically significant long-run 
returns over the entire period. The mean returns of IPOs range from 4.22 per cent over 
the first year after their offerings to -16.40 per cent over the five-year horizon. Over the 
period from 1991 to 1998, similar to Ritter and Welch (2002), we find that IPOs have, 
on average, no abnormal returns regardless of the considered horizon. We also calculate 
long-run performance using the Fama-French three-factor model. The parameter of 
interest in this regression is the intercept, alpha. A negative intercept indicates that after 
controlling for market, size, and book- to-market factors in returns, a sample firm 
performed worse than expected. Intercepts (alpha) are positive regardless of the 
considered period. The Fama-French model shows that investing in IPO portfolios leads 
to a statistically significant (at 1 per cent level) 0.78 per cent return per month over the 
entire period. 
Insert Table 3 
 
We now distinguish IPO firms according to the level of analyst coverage. The 
findings are reported in table 4. We find that market participants make a relevant 
distinction between orphan and non-oprhan IPO firms over the entire period (1991-
2010). For instance, the three-year return of non-orphans is -1.17 per cent, compared to 
-18.09 per cent for orphan IPOs, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. These findings are confirmed over the five-year returns. The Fama-French 
model shows that investing an equal amount in non-orphan IPO portfolios provides a 
0.91 per cent return per month, which is statistically significant (at the 1% level), 
compared to orphan IPO portfolios (monthly return of 0.11 per cent). The 1990s reveal 
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that the differences between orphan and non-orphan IPOs appear in the first year 
following the offering. It is worth noting that the one-year returns show the analysts’ 
ability to predict the long-run performance before the disclosure of financial statements. 
At the time of the IPO, investors are limited to the material information contained in the 
prospectus, and informational asymmetries are particularly high. In the first year after 
the offering, the non-orphans exhibit positive abnormal performance, while the orphans 
exhibit no abnormal performance. The internet bubble period (1999-2000) demonstrates 
similar findings. The 2000s reveal the opposite result, meaning that orphan IPOs exhibit 
higher returns than non-orphan IPOs in the first year after their issues. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (not confirmed by the calendar-time 
approach). This could be attributable to recent scandals involving financial analysts; as 
a consequence, analyst coverage may have become worth less to investors. 
Insert Table 4 
 
Venture capital affiliation, underwriting syndication, institutional investor 
ownership and underpricing have been shown to influence the long-run performance of 
IPO firms. Therefore, if there is a relationship between analyst coverage and long-run 
performance, it may be a manifestation of these variables. We investigate these potential 
relationships by focusing on each of them individually. 
The results of venture capital (VC) affiliation are presented in table 5. We 
partition our sample into VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. We find 
significant differences in the long-run performances of orphan and non-orphan VC-
backed IPOs. Whatever the horizon and period considered, the long-run returns of non-
orphan VC-backed IPOs outperform those of their orphan counterparts. The alpha of the 
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Fama-French model presents similar findings but the difference in returns is not 
statistically significant. 
These results hold for non-VC-backed IPOs except in the 2000s, when investors paid no 
attention to analyst coverage. 
Insert Table 5 
 
From table 6, we can see that non-orphan IPOs with large underwriting 
syndicates (IPOs in which the number of managing underwriters is above the median 
are classified as ‘large’; otherwise, they are classified as ‘small’) outperform orphan 
IPOs. The one-year returns of non-orphan IPOs with large underwriting syndicates are -
1.05 per cent compared to -32.05 per cent for orphan IPOs with large underwriting 
syndicates over the period from 1991 to 2010. The 31.60 per cent difference is 
significant at the 1 per cent level. These results hold for three and five-year returns. An 
exception occurs during the past decade, when there is no difference between orphan 
and non-orphan IPOs with large underwriting syndicates. Panel B indicates that the 
difference between orphan and non-orphan IPOs with small underwriting syndicates is 
only statistically significant over a five-year horizon. However, we find that, over the 
period from 2001 to 2010, orphan IPOs with small underwriting syndicates exhibit 
better performances than their non-orphan counterparts during the first year after the 
issue. The difference of -25.52 per cent is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
(not confirmed by the calendar-time approach). 
Insert Table 6 
 
Table 7 shows that, over the entire period, highly underpriced non-orphan IPOs 
(IPOs with underpricing above the median level are classified as ‘high’; otherwise, they 
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are classified as ‘low’) outperform their orphan counterparts over the one- and five-year 
horizons (the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels). The alpha 
of the Fama-French model identifies significant differences between orphan and non-
orphan highly underpriced IPOs, with an average return of -0.08 per cent per month for 
orphans compared to an average of 0.82 per cent per month for non-orphans. The 
difference of 0.86 per cent per month is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
We find no differences between the long-run returns of orphan and non-orphan 
minimally underpriced IPOs over the entire period. Hence, analyst coverage has 
investment value only for highly underpriced IPOs. 
Insert Table 7 
 
Once we account for ownership structure, table 8 shows that non-orphan IPOs 
with a high level of institutional investor ownership (IPOs with institutional investor 
ownership above the median level are classified as ‘high’; otherwise, they are classified 
as ‘low’) outperform their orphan counterparts. The event-time approach indicates that 
the difference is statistically significant regardless of the considered horizon. However, 
in the 2000s, this difference is only statistically significant over a five-year horizon. 
Globally, these results hold for IPOs with a low level of institutional investor 
ownership. 
Insert Table 8 
 
In summary, these findings suggest that investors and market participants pay 
attention to analyst coverage when IPOs have large underwriting syndicates and are 
highly underpriced. The differences between orphans and non-orphans persist in VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs and whatever the ownership structure of the IPOs 
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(that is, those with a high versus low level of institutional investors). The 2000s reveals 
that the differences between orphan and non-orphan IPO firms are diminishing. 
Next, we investigate the characteristics of analyst coverage by determining the 
number of financial analysts providing coverage. Numerous studies have documented a 
positive relationship between the coverage number and the subsequent short- and long-
run performances (Bradley et al., 2003; Das et al., 2006). These findings are reported in 
table 9. We find that IPOs with a high level of coverage (those with a coverage number 
above the median level are classified as ‘high’; otherwise, they are classified as ‘low’) 
perform better than IPOs with low coverage from three to five years after the IPO date. 
For instance, from 1991 to 2010, the five-year returns of IPOs with high coverage are 
10.30 per cent compared to a -29.88 per cent for IPOs with low coverage. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This result holds for the 
1990s and the 2000s. 
Insert Table 9 
 
To verify that the univariate results presented in tables 4 through 9 are robust in 
a multivariate setting, we report our regression model in able 10. The dependent 
variable in the regression is the long-run performance of IPOs, as determined by the 
BHARs over one, three, and five years. As Bradley et al. (2008b) note that a common 
oversight in examining analyst coverage is the endogenous problem between 
performance and analyst coverage. That is, the quality of an IPO is slowly revealed to 
the public through financial statements and other public sources after it has been issued. 
Therefore, other savvy investors could have predicted the long-run IPO performance. 
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The analysts may just be jumping on the bandwagon when information is provided by 
other sources, such as financial statements. Our research model overcomes this obstacle. 
Table 10 reports our regression results (corrected for heteroscedasticity and 
multicollinearity). We use a 2SLS regression model to account for the endogenous 
problem (i.e., that the more valuable firms would likely attract more analysts). The 
coverage variable is endogenous, and we use instrument variables such as trading 
volume and intangibles that are known to influence analyst coverage but not long-run 
performance (Bhushan, 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Barth et al., 2001). The 
results of our model are statistically significant and it helps to explain the long-run 
performance of US IPOs. 
We find non-orphan IPOs to be positively and significantly related to long-run 
performance over the five-year horizon, which is broadly consistent with the univariate 
analysis results given in table 3. This finding reveals that market participants do not 
fully incorporate the perceived value of analyst coverage. Both the syndicate and 
operating performance variables explain a significant component of the long-run IPO 
performance regardless of the considered horizon. The other variables (such as 
underpricing, VC backing and institutional investors) fail to explain the long-run 
performance of US IPOs over the period from 1991 to 2010. 
Insert Table 10 
 
4. Conclusion 
We examine the long-run performance of US IPOs carried out between 1991 and 
2010 and find that the IPOs in our sample performed negatively relative to the 
comparison portfolio over this period, but this result varies substantially across sub-
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periods. We compare the long-run performance of firms that do not receive analyst 
coverage (orphans) to those that do (non-orphans). This abnormal long-run performance 
is considerably more severe for orphan IPOs than for non-orphan IPOs given a three- to 
five-year horizon. The evidence suggests that analyst coverage is indeed important to 
the issuing firm but the market does not fully incorporate the perceived value of this 
coverage. Once we control for other characteristics that have been shown to influence 
the long-run performance of IPOs, we find that investors and market participants pay 
attention to analyst coverage when IPOs have large underwriting syndicates and are 
highly underpriced. The difference between orphans and non-orphans persists in VC-
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs, and whatever the ownership structures of the IPOs. 
Notably, however, the 2000s reveals that the difference between orphan and non-orphan 
IPO firms is diminishing. This trend may be attributable to scandals affecting analyst 
coverage, as both regulators and the financial press have identified analyst research that 
had been tainted by conflicts of interest. 
Finally, multivariate regression analysis establishes that analyst coverage is 
significantly related to the long-run performance of IPOs, contrary to the study of 
Bradley et al. (2008b). 
Notes 
1. “Pour un nouvel essor de l’analyse financière indépendante sur le marché 
français”, AMF, 2005. 
2. Hoberg and Seyhun (2009) examine the collaboration between underwriters and 
venture capitalists in IPOs. 
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Table 1: Description of the IPO sample  
Panel A: Number of sample IPO firms by sub-period  
1991/1998 301   
1999/2000 122   
2001/2010 842   
    
Panel B: Sample IPO firms classified by market capitalization (price * shares) at the end of the 
first month following the offering 
Market capitalization, in millions 
USD 
Per cent of 
sample 
Number of IPOs  
Less than $50 11.78 149  
$50-$99.9 9.09 115  
$100-$199.99 15.89 201  
$200-$399.99 21.50 272  
$400-$999.99 23.16 293  
Greater than $1000 18.58 235  
All IPO firms 100 1265  
    
Panel C: Industry distribution of sample IPO firms, by two-digit SIC code  
 SIC code Per cent of 
sample 
Number of 
IPOs 
Business services (73) 17 215 
Chemicals and allied products (28) 11.78 149 
Electronic equipment (36) 10.83 137 
Instruments (38) 7.19 91 
Oil and gas (13) 4.74 60 
Industrial equipment (35) 3.87 49 
Communications (48) 2.92 37 
Electric services (49) 2.77 35 
Management and related services (87) 2.53 32 
Water transportation (44) 2.45 31 
Miscellaneous retail (59) 2.06 26 
Other industries (various) 31.86 403 
All IPO firms  100 1265 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of orphan and non-orphan IPOs from 1991 to 2010  
This table provides characteristics of orphans and non-orphans. An orphan (non-orphan) is an 
IPO without analyst coverage (with analyst coverage). IPO is the number of issuing firms. AGE 
is the age in years of the issuing firm at the time of the offer. LONG-TERM DEBT represents 
all interest-bearing financial obligations in millions, excluding amounts due within one year, at 
the offering date. SIZE is the market capitalization in millions at the offering date. VC 
AFFILIATION is the percentage of firms that are affiliated with venture capitalists. 
UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE is the number of managing underwriters (lead plus co-
managers). UNDERPRICING is the percentage difference between the close on the first day of 
trading and the offer price. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS is the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares at the time of the offering. 
Student’s parametric t-tests and Wilcoxon (w) non-parametric tests are presented to estimate 
whether the difference between sample distributions is statistically significant. *, ** and *** 
indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Orphan Non-orphan t w 
IPO 253 1012   
AGE 17 23 1.2 0.2 
LONG-TERM DEBT 129.63 431.17 2.6*** 3.9*** 
SIZE 309.61 1067.46 2.7*** 9.6*** 
VC AFFILIATION 5.95 38.51 -1.1 -1.1 
UNDERWRITING SYNDICATE 6.86 6.48 -0.5 1.9** 
UNDERPRICING 13.85 15.53 0.8 1.8* 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 31.74 73.89 15.6*** 11.8*** 
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Table 3: Long-run performance of IPO firms 
The long-run BHARs over the 12-, 36-, and 60-month returns are reported. Fama-French is the alpha of running the Fama-French (1993) three-factor regression 
model. Table presents 1265 IPOs made between 1991 and 2010. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is used to estimate whether the BHAR or the alpha are 
statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  1991-1998  1999-2000  2001-2010  1991-2010  
  Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
BHAR 
(size & book-to-market 
adjusted) 
        
          
 60-month returns -12.94 -1.5 -56.13 -3.3*** -6.38 -1.4 -16.40 -3.5*** 
 36-month returns 1.41 0.2 -36.09 -3*** -1.43 -0.5 -4.57 -1.5 
 12-month retunrs 5.85 1.5 -31.07 -3.3*** 8.76 3.8*** 4.22 2.2** 
 
Fama-French         
 
 Alpha 0.98 3*** 1.47 1.7* 0.46 1.3 0.78 3.3*** 
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Table 4: Long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms from 1991 to 2010 
Table 4 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms over the period from 1991 to 2010. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-
hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between 
sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan 253 -52.95 -5.1*** -18.09 -2.1** 5.31 1.2 0.11 0.4 
Non-orphan 1012 -8.07 -1.7* -1.17 -0.4 3.95 2** 0.91 3.9*** 
Difference  44.87 4.6*** 16.92 2.3** -1.35 -0.3 0.75 2.9*** 
1991 to 1998 
Orphan 52 -67.16 -3*** -14.57 -0.5 -11.12 -1.3 0.26 0.7 
Non-orphan 249 -1.62 -0.2 4.74 0.7 9.39 2.3** 1.07 3.2*** 
Difference  65.54 3.7*** 19.32 0.9 20.51 2.3** 0.53 1.2 
1999 to 2000 
Orphan 22 -141.25 -4.1*** -72.35 -2** -54.80 -2.1** -0.55 -0.4 
Non-orphan 100 -37.41 -2.1** -28.11 -2.1** -25.85 -2.6*** 1.96 2.3** 
Difference  103.84 3.2*** 44.24 2.1** 28.95 2.4*** 2.50 2.9*** 
2001 to 2010 
Orphan 179 -17.19 -1.5 -10.97 -1.5 17.47 3.6*** -0.01 -0.1 
Non-orphan 663 -3.72 -0.8 1.22 0.4 6.40 2.6*** 0.55 1.5 
Difference  13.47 1.3 12.19 1.5 -11.06 -1.9** 0.56 1.8* 
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Table 5: Long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by an underwriting syndicate 
Table 5 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by underwriting syndicate over the period from 1991 to 2010. Firms with a number 
of managers above the median level are classified as large, otherwise small. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 
60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically 
significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
  Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Panel A: Large syndicate 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -115.61 -5.9*** -64.11 -2.6*** -32.65 -2.8*** 0.22 0.5 
Non-orphan  -16.20 -1.8* -7.60 -1.5 -1.05 -0.3 0.97 2.5*** 
Difference  99.41 4.9*** 56.52 3.9*** 31.60 3.1*** 0.50 1.2 
1991 to 2000 
Orphan  -123.4 -5.6*** -69.57 -3.9*** -38.94 -2.4*** 0.17 0.2 
Non-orphan  -36.54 -2.1** -20.16 -2.4*** -6.85 -1.2 1.65 2.5*** 
Difference  96.90 4.5*** 49.41 3.6*** 32.09 3.3*** 1.1 1.5 
2001 to 2010 
Orphan  -56.08 -0.3 -46.82 -0.5 -14.28 -0.8 0.20 0.3 
Non-orphan  9.93 0.7 8.71 1.1 5.41 0.7 0.29 0.7 
Difference  66.01 1 55.54 1.4 19.69 0.9 0.1 0.2 
 
Panel B: Small syndicate 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -49.68 -2.1** 1.37 0.1 9.27 1.1 0.39 0.8 
Non-orphan  3.15 0.4 8.28 1.5 2.61 1 1.00 4.3*** 
Difference  52.84 2.8*** 6.90 0.4 -6.66 -0.7 0.55 1.2 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -53.03 -1.9** 8.17 0.3 -8.45 -0.8 0.88 1.5 
Non-orphan  5.06 0.5 13.21 1.4 6.39 1.5 1.28 3.8*** 
Difference  58.08 2.7*** 5.03 0.2 14.84 1.4 0.34 0.7 
2001 to 2010          
Orphan  -25.61 -0.1 -8.42 0.1 25.63 2.2** -0.10 -0.1 
Non-orphan  -3.14 -0.3 2.68 0.5 0.11 0.1 0.61 2** 
Difference  22.47 1.2 11.11 0.6 -25.52 -1.9** 0.70 0.9 
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Table 6: Long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by underpricing 
Table 6 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by underpricing over the period from 1991 to 2010. IPOs that are underpriced above 
the median level are classified as high, otherwise low. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60-months. A 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** 
and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
  Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Panel A: High underpriced 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -81.39 -3.6*** -28.40 -1.2 -13.56 -1.7* -0.08 -0.2 
Non-orphan  -5.42 -0.7 0.29 0.1 0.77 0.3 0.82 3.5*** 
Difference  75.97 4.3*** 28.68 1.5 14.32 1.7* 0.86 2.4*** 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -79.58 -3.4*** -26.36 -0.8 -20.36 -1.9** 0.39 0.8 
Non-orphan  -11.94 -1.2 -8.06 -1 -1.18 -0.3 1.13 3.5*** 
Difference  67.63 3.6*** 18.29 0.9 19.18 2.1** 0.69 1.5 
2001 to 2010 
Orphan  -105 -0.1 -35.98 -0.7 3.28 0.2 -0.54 -0.8 
Non-orphan  12.15 1.2 10.15 2.1** 2.45 0.6 0.48 1.4 
Difference  117.15 1.7* 46.14 1.1 -0.83 -0.1 0.99 1.7* 
 
Panel B: Low underpriced 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -63.55 -2.3** -44.98 -2.1** -10.68 -0.8 -0.20 -0.3 
Non-orphan  -10.18 -0.6 -3.70 -0.3 -4.17 -0.9 0.69 2.3** 
Difference  53.36 1.6 41.28 1.6 6.51 0.5 0.95 1.5 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -79.21 -2.7*** -31.79 -0.9 -24.91 -1.2 -0.23 -0.3 
Non-orphan  -6.31 -0.3 13.76 0.8 4.96 0.5 0.81 1.7* 
Difference  72.90 2** 45.55 1.5 29.87 1.6* 1.20 1.3 
2001 to 2010          
Orphan  30.43 1.8* -60.81 -1.9** -0.64 -0.1 -0.37 -0.4 
Non-orphan  -18.91 -0.8 -19.69 -2.3** -9.41 -2.2** 0.45 1.2 
Difference  -49.34 -1.3 41.12 1.7* -8.77 -0.6 0.82 0.9 
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Table 7: Long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by venture capital affiliation 
Table 7 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by venture capital affiliation over the period from 1991 to 2010. Long-run 
performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether 
the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
  Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Panel A: VC-backed IPOs 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -81.36 -3.1*** -30.96 -0.7 -26.70 -1.7* 0.27 0.5 
Non-orphan  -15.45 -1.7* -5.02 -0.7 4.13 0.9 1 2.7*** 
Difference  65.90 2.8*** 25.94 0.9 30.83 2.3*** 0.70 1.3 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -87.15 -3*** -26.80 -0.5 -29.56 -1.4 1.05 1.3 
Non-orphan  -20.82 -1.8* -13.10 -1.3 -0.04 -0.1 1.75 3.8*** 
Difference  66.33 2.4*** 13.70 0.4 29.52 2** 0.71 1.1 
2001 to 2010 
Orphan  -23.39 -0.1 -51.73 -0.6 -12.43 -0.2 -0.41 -0.5 
Non-orphan  2.32 0.2 12.34 1.3 13.09 2.3** 0.19 0.3 
Difference  25.71 1.1 64.07 3.1*** 25.52 1.2 0.60 0.7 
 
Panel B: Non–VC-backed IPOs 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -87.05 -4.1*** -37.07 -2.2** -17.42 -2.5*** -0.12 -0.3 
Non-orphan  -0.01 -0.1 2.88 0.4 2.57 0.8 0.56 2.5*** 
Difference  87.04 4.4*** 39.95 2.8*** 19.99 2.9*** 0.66 1.5 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -90.57 -3.7*** -35.12 -2.3*** -20.39 -2.6*** -0.38 -0.8 
Non-orphan  -4.38 -0.4 2.39 0.3 -1.26 -0.3 0.81 2.5*** 
Difference  86.19 4.4*** 37.51 2.6*** 19.12 2.5*** 1.17 2.4*** 
2001 to 2010          
Orphan  -56.08 -0.4 -44.19 -0.5 -6.52 -0.4 0.10 0.1 
Non-orphan  19.32 0.8 3.93 0.4 10.67 2.4*** 0.28 0.9 
Difference  75.40 1.1 48.12 1.2 17.20 1.1 0.18 0.2 
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Table 8: Long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by institutional investor ownership 
Table 8 presents the long-run performance of orphan and non-orphan IPO firms by institutional investor ownership over the period from 1991 to 2010. Firms with a 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares at the time of the offering that is above the median level are 
classified as high, otherwise low. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 months. A bootstrapped skewness-
adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically significant. *, ** and *** indicate 
significant differences at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
  Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Panel A: High institutional investor ownership 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -53.70 -1 -26.66 -1.9* -13.32 -1.7* 1.11 1.1 
Non-orphan  19.42 2.3** 18.07 3*** 12.43 3.1*** 1.56 3*** 
Difference  73.12 2.8*** 44.73 3.2*** 25.75 3.1*** 0.45 0.4 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -46.09 -0.7 -33.08 -1.8* -18.24 -1.7* 1.35 1.3 
Non-orphan  17.04 1.8* 11.95 1.6 9.25 1.8* 1.75 5.9*** 
Difference  63.13 2.2** 45.03 3.3*** 27.49 2.9*** 0.25 0.2 
2001 to 2010 
Orphan  -95.51 -1.3 -6.49 -0.1 2.15 0.1 0.48 0.2 
Non-orphan  30.53 1.5 39.71 3.3*** 23.67 3.2*** 0.93 0.8 
Difference  126.05 2** 46.20 1.2 21.54 1.5 0.87 0.3 
 
Panel B: Low institutional investor ownership
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
Orphan  -83.76 -7.4*** -42.65 -2.7*** -15.41 -2.6*** -0.63 -0.9 
Non-orphan  -24.78 -2.1** -5.19 -0.4 -9.40 -1.6 -0.05 -0.1 
Difference  58.97 4*** 37.47 2.6*** 6.01 0.8 0.65 1.6 
1991 to 2000          
Orphan  -84.69 -6.8*** -42.85 -2.2** -18.24 -2.7*** 0.08 0.2 
Non-orphan  -30.83 -2.2** -6.59 -0.4 -14.73 -1.9* 0.26 0.5 
Difference  53.87 3.5*** 36.25 2.1** 3.50 0.4 0.36 0.8 
2001 to 2010          
Orphan  -71.62 -0.9 -41.45 -1.1 2.01 0.1 -1.93 -1.4 
Non-orphan  4.42 0.2 -0.65 -0.1 7.79 1 -0.74 -0.6 
Difference  76.05 1.4 40.80 1.3 5.78 0.4 1.19 1.5 
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Table 9: Long-run performance of non-orphan IPO firms based on analyst coverage from 1991 to 2010. 
Table 9 presents the long-run performance of non-orphan IPO firms based on analyst coverage over the period from 1991 to 2010. Those with an amount of analyst 
coverage above the median level are classified as high, otherwise low. Long-run performance is computed as buy-and-hold abnormal returns over 12, 36, and 60 
months. A bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distributions are statistically 
significant. *, ** and *** indicate significant difference at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
  Size & book-to-market adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha (%) t-stat 
Full sample: 1991 to 2010 
High coverage  10.30 1.8* 9.80 2.5*** 5.46 1.8* 1.13 4.6*** 
Low coverage  -29.88 -4.6*** -14.77 -3.2*** 2.14 0.9 0.74 2.6*** 
Difference  40.18 5.3*** 24.57 4.3*** 3.31 0.8 -0.39 -1.7* 
1991 to 2000 
High coverage  12.16 1.2 16.01 2** 8.08 1.6 1.56 4.8*** 
Low coverage  -41.27 -3.4*** -29.96 -3.1*** -11.45 -2.2** 1.01 2.5*** 
Difference  53.44 4.1*** 45.97 4.5*** 19.52 2.9 -0.54 -1.5 
2001 to 2010 
High coverage  8.10 1.2 5.61 1.3 4.06 1.1 0.63 1.7* 
Low coverage  -17.29 -3.3*** -4.27 -0.8 9.19 3.1*** 0.49 1.2 
Difference  25.40 3.2*** 9.87 1.4 -5.12 -1.1 -0.14 -0.6 
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Table 10: Cross-sectional regressions of long-run performance of IPOs from 1991-2010 
The dependant variable is buy-and-hold abnormal return. *, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively, using Student’s t-test. We use the 2SLS regression model. The instrumented variable is coverage. The instrument variables are trading volume and 
intangibles. 
 BHAR 60  
803 observations 
BHAR 36 
1076 observations 
BHAR 12 
1265 observations 
Intercept -0.909** -0.148 0.108 
Orphan 1.274** 0.118 -0.089 
Syndicate -0.461*** -0.192*** -0.070 
Underpricing -0.013 0.070 0.042 
VC backing -0.067 -0.060 -0.036 
Institutional investors 0.003 0.076 0.095 
Coverage 0.161 0.222* 0.034 
ROA -0.014** -0.004 0.004 
Asset turnover -0.002** -0.003*** -0.009 
Sales 0.002*** 0.004*** -0.004 
Capital expenditures -0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
  
Definition of regression variables: 
  
Orphan Dummy variable equals 1 if IPOs have analyst coverage and 0 otherwise. 
Syndicate Dummy variable equals 1 if the number of managing underwriters is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
Underpricing Dummy variable equals 1 if an IPO’s initial return is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
VC backing Dummy variable equals 1 if venture capitalists are affiliated with the IPO at the time of the offering and 0 
otherwise. 
Institutional investors Dummy variable equals 1 if the percentage of shares held by institutional investors who hold 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares at the time of the offering is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
Coverage Dummy variable equals 1 if the amount of coverage is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
ROA Natural logarithm of the change in return on assets. The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date. 
Asset turnover Natural logarithm of the change in asset turnover (sales divided by total assets) The change is measured 1, 3 and 
5 years after the IPO date. 
Sales Natural logarithm of the change in sales. The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO date. 
Capital expenditures Natural logarithm of the change in capital expenditures The change is measured 1, 3 and 5 years after the IPO 
date. 
 
 
